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Power, desire and emotions in education: revisiting the epistolary 
narratives of three women in apartheid South Africa 
 
 
Maria Tamboukou, Centre for Narrative Research, University of East London 
 
Abstract: In this paper I will attempt to consider emotions in the context of three 
women’s lives, whose passion for education brought them together and then 
tore them apart along axes of difference defined by race, class and age in 
apartheid South Africa. I am looking in particular into the correspondence 
between Lily Moya, Mabel Palmer, and Sibusisiwe Makhanya, published in 1987 
by Shula Marks and having since become an almost canonical reading in the 
‘intersectionality’ literature. In revisiting this correspondence, I am exploring 
how culturally differentiated emotions, as inscribed in the three women’s 
epistolary narratives, can open up spaces for the subject of feminism to emerge. In 
this context, what I suggest is that reclaiming emotions within current 
educational discourses and practices can have significant effects not only on how 
lives are shaped and subjectivities formed, but also on how we can rethink about 
what feminism is and what it can do.  
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Power, desire and emotions in education: revisiting the 
epistolary narratives of three women in apartheid South 
Africa 
 
 
For congenial reasons I had to leave Adams, due to the fact that I was never 
meant to be a stone but a human being with feelings, not either an 
experimental doll (Marks, 1987, p.186). 
 
Theses are the last lines of a letter that Lily Moya1, a Xhosa fifteen-year-old 
young woman growing up in the Transkei in South Africa was addressing to Dr 
Mabel Palmer, an elderly white academic, Fabian socialist, suffragette and then 
organiser of the Natal University College’s Non-European Section. Lily was 
writing this letter on July 26th, 1951, just after she had taken the decision to leave 
Adams College where she had been studying for her matriculation exams—the 
final school leaving examinations. For a poor orphan girl like Lily, studying at a 
famous South African high school—the oldest educational establishment in 
Natal—should have been perceived as a real privilege. Actually, in the course of 
the two previous years, Lily had fought really hard to find a way to pursue her 
education. Having learnt about Mabel’s pioneering activities in establishing 
higher education for Natal’s African and Indian population, she had written to 
her asking for help. Lily’s first letter written on January 4th, 1949 from Umtata, 
the community where she lived with her parental uncle, initiated a whole 
correspondence that was to last for about two and a half years and was soon to 
include other parts. This correspondence, edited2 and published by Shula Marks 
in 1987 by the University of Natal Press in Durban South Africa, has become a 
well known piece in the intersectionality literature3. It was almost immediately 
published by the London-based Women’s Press and by Indiana University Press 
in the United States. Moreover, the publication has surpassed the interest of 
purely academic circles and was dramatized for BBC Radio Four `Women's Hour' 
in 2001. In presenting her work to a wider audience on BBC, Shula Marks has 
pithily commented: 
 
The letters in front of me opened up an intimate and personal world of 
women's concerns with obligation and duty, philanthropy and welfare, 
sexuality and marriage, independence and social control. They illuminated 
more of the South African condition than the majority of history textbooks: 
the generosities, yet limitations, of white liberalism, the nature of mission 
education; the socialization of black girls; and the dilemmas they confront. 
This was a quite different way of understanding history and the impact of 
race, and class and gender in South Africa's complex social order. (Marks, 
BBC, Radio 4, 19th, March, 2001, 7.45pm) 
 
It is in the light of such a wide circulation and reception that Margaretta Jolly 
(2002, p.268) has presented this correspondence as an exemplary case of ‘a post-
1970s feminist interest in women’s difference‘, a publication interrogating 
sisterhood and portraying political conflicts within feminism. Indeed, Shula 
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Marks (1987) has done an exceptionally careful and meticulous study of the 
historical, cultural and political background framing the lives and deeds of the 
three correspondents. Marks has pointed to the ground upon which these three 
women stood and communicated with each other and this was indeed their 
common desire for women’s education. At the same time however, Marks has 
traced not only the grand axes of difference that pulled them apart, namely class, 
race and age but also  more subtle differentiations as those of intertribal conflicts, 
unique personal trajectories and different processes and effects of colonization. 
According to Marks’ analysis it was in the social milieu of these structural 
differences that Lily’s experience at Adams college turned out to be a disaster. 
Her final letter quoted in the beginning of this paper emphasizes her disillusion 
and her desperate seek for emotional support: ‘I was never meant to be a stone 
but a human being with feelings’. As Marks has remarked Mabel Palmer and 
later Sibusisiwe Makhanya failed Lily Moya on emotional grounds. Marks’ 
illuminating introduction actually concludes with the comment that: ‘The love, 
support and attention Lily desperately craved were denied her to the end.’ (1987, 
p.42) 
 
This paper is actually deployed in the space opened up after Marks’ concluding 
sentence, exploring the effects of the force of emotions in producing realities and 
subjectivities within education. Being aware of the politically significant history of 
the publication of this correspondence, I have nonetheless reread it from a 
different angle: I have been more interested in the constitutive power of 
emotions rather than in their failure. Indeed, in immersing myself in the three 
women’s letters, what has profoundly struck me is the way emotions are 
emerging and then gradually intertwined with power relations, producing 
different effects for the subjects that are involved in their complex network.  As 
Smith and Watson (2001) have commented, life narratives —and letters are an 
important part of this genre—can have different histories, multiple audiences, 
diverse readings and a wide range of perspectives from which they can be read 
and used4. In attempting ‘a different’ reading, I am not in any way downplaying 
the critical role of macro-structures of difference in creating conditions of 
possibility for particular events and subjectivities to emerge. On the contrary, it is 
on the complex intersection of grand and minor differences that these epistolary 
narratives are mapped.  
 
My reading therefore focuses on the forceful way emotions emerge in the 
epistolary narratives under scrutiny to produce effects and create new social 
realities. What I want to suggest is that the situation initiated in the context of this 
correspondence is a specific paradigm of how lives can be so badly shaped when 
emotions are written out and how on the other hand revisiting the force of 
emotions can make a difference in the ways we relate to ourselves and to others, 
particularly so when examined within educational contexts. In considering 
emotions, what I am further attempting to do is to rethink what feminism is 
about and what it can do. In this light I am following Meg Boler who has raised 
the question of how emotions can be ‘reclaimed’ as part of our cognitive and 
ethical inquiry …[in the] hope for changing the quality of [our] lives and taking 
action towards freedom and social justice’ (1999, p.xiv). What can we—feminist 
educators today—learn about what we do, how can we change what we do as 
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we lead our professional lives working with students—women amongst them—
striving to make their way in the sometimes threatening territories of academic 
knowledge, trying to make sense of what has occasionally gone wrong with 
their studies, crying and despairing within and beyond the spaces and places of 
various educational institutions. As Boler has further commented:  
 
We need only think of the countless instances of affect in the classroom that 
we rarely acknowledge explicitly: the heated debates and loaded silences in 
discussion of controversial texts; the dynamics of "success" and failure" 
evoked when we hand back student essays; the shuffling of boredom, 
curiosity, confusion during a lecture. These unspoken emotions and affects 
shape our sense of interest and passion in the educational process. (1997, 
p.260) 
 
My twofold concern with the power of emotions and with the power of 
feminism is ultimately mapped on my on-going project of writing feminist 
genealogies (See, Tamboukou, 1999, 2003a, 2003b). It is my interest in 
genealogical explorations of the constitution of the female self that I have once 
more turned to the archives, the forgotten dusty documents inscribing other 
possible ways of being or rather of becoming a woman, beyond dominant 
perceptions, discourses and practices. As Teresa de Lauretis has argued, it is from 
the interstices and margins of hegemonic discourses that the subject of feminism 
emerges (1987). 
 
Emotions have indeed remained in the margins of theoretical discussions around 
the structuring of inequalities in education, which have always revolved around 
the binary opposition between truth and reason on the one hand and passions 
and emotions on the other. Although there has been a relatively recent 
resurgence in the research and literature around emotional learning, this interest 
has been dominated by a utilitarian discourse of controlling emotions and 
creating ‘emotionally intelligent subjects’ (See, Boler, 1999). My interest however 
lies in exploring the grey area of emotions as a field of subjugated knowledges, 
opening up possibilities for deterritorializations to be actualised. In this context, I 
am charting emotions in a cartography of power relations and flows of desire, 
following theorists who have interrogated the reason/passion binarism and 
have identified the need for culturally specific histories, or rather genealogies of 
particular emotions to be written (See, Boler, 1999).  
 
Making Spinozist connections 
 
In considering power, desire and emotions, the analysis of this paper is 
inevitably situated within a Spinozist plane of thinking. Why Spinoza, the 
question has often been raised particularly in the feminist strand of Spinozist 
scholarship. (See, James, 2000). As Genevieve Lloyd has argued, Spinoza’s 
philosophy ‘offers an alternative to Cartesian ways of thinking about the body 
and its relation to the mind’ (2000, p.41) and opens up possibilities ‘for a 
reconceptualization of the imaginary’. Problematizing emotions in tracing 
genealogical lines of their interweaving in feminist educational praxis very much 
involves questions around the troubled body/mind relation and the role of 
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imagination in the will to knowledge. These are themes that will further be 
deployed in the analysis of this paper. What I want to do now however, is to 
chart lines of thought that will be more specifically followed in the narrative 
analysis of the letters. Having already placed my interest within a Spinozist 
plane, the vocabularies I have used so far to formulate the theoretical milieu of 
this paper have already rather explicitly revealed the deployment of feminist 
analytics in making connections with Foucault’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work. In this context, what I suggest is that Foucault’s theorization of power 
illuminates Boler’s argument that emotions constitute a site of discipline and 
social control, while Deleuze and Guattari’s take on desire can shed more light on 
emotions as a site of resistance (Boler, 1999).  
 
In further deploying the project of making connections I have been interested in 
setting out a plane of consistency for Foucauldian analytics of power and 
DeleuzoGuattarian flows of desire to work together (See Patton, 2000). In 
Deleuze’s and Guattari’s analyses, desire is regarded as an autonomous and 
productive force shaping the social rather than being determined by it. Instead of 
being ideological, desire is the real material thing: ‘desire is always constitutive of 
a social field…desire is in production, just as production is in desire as desiring-
production’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, p.348).  
 
In the same vein, power is for Foucault a material entity of relations at play. As 
Deleuze stresses, power for Foucault, ‘isn’t just the relation of a force to a being 
or an object, but corresponds to the relation of a force to the other forces it 
affects, or even to forces that affect it (Deleuze, 1990, p.117). According to Patton, 
this affective dimension of power in Foucault forms rhizomes with the Deleuzian 
notion of desire and becoming (2000, p.53). Furthermore in his theorization of 
power as a cluster of relations, Foucault has considered the functioning of these 
relations as ‘an economy of power’ (1982, pp.210-11), while Deleuze and Guattari 
have theorized multiple ways in the flowing of desire through machinic 
assemblages and have stated that ‘desiring-machines are the fundamental 
category of the economy of desire’ (1984, p.32).  
 
What I want to suggest here is that emotional learning in education is a field par 
excellence for the study of how economies of power and economies of desire 
produce realities and segmentarities, but also incite deterritorializations and open 
up space for lines of flight to be set into motion, irrespective of the fact that they 
will also allow grounds for reterritorializations to occur.  In this light there is a 
need to explore power/desire connections in specific contexts and see how the 
discursive field of culturally differentiated emotions can provide the grounds for 
desire and power to dance together in the production of affects. It is staging such 
encounters that I take the thread of the epistolary narratives further examining 
the microphysics of emotions, ‘bringing them out of the private and into the 
public sphere’ (Boler, 1999, p.xx). 
 
 
On the microphysics of power, desire and emotions 
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In my attempt to work with situated analyses of the politics of emotions I will 
now focus on specific narrative lines of the correspondence, charting them on a 
plane where relations of power, desire, affects and emotions make connections. 
In turning to the study of narratives revolving around emotions I am aware of 
the inherent limitations of this project in the theorization of affects5. As it has 
been suggested, while emotions are embedded within dominant linguistic codes 
and highly territorialized social practices and institutions, affects follow ‘lines of 
flight’, escaping planes of consistency and following unpredictable directions—
they are forces of deterritorialization par excellence. (See, Massumi, 1996) I am 
therefore aware that a narrative approach to the study of affects and emotions is 
necessarily limited within what can only be represented in discourse and in this 
sense what is inevitably left out is a huge area of non-discursive bodily affects 
that can only be approached through my own and indeed my readers’ 
imagination. However, as I will further discuss later on in this paper, the 
Spinozist plane of this theoretical endeavour allows space for imagination to 
become the medium through which different social and affective realities can be 
accessed (see Lloyd, 1996, p.63). Feminist philosophers, Moira Gatens and 
Gnevieve Lloyd (1999) have followed trails of Spinoza’s conceptualization of 
imagination to make a forceful suggestion about the power of ‘collective 
imaginings’ as an ethico/political project opening up new ways of living and 
communicating with and through others in our difference. It is—as I will further 
argue—this collectively imagined possibility of connectedness that can constitute 
planes of consistency upon which feminism can still be claimed as a relevant and 
indeed necessary theoretical and political platform. 
 
Clearly looking at these epistolary narratives through the theoretical lenses of 
what Rossi Braidotti has charted as philosophies of radical immanence (2002) 
inevitably has its own limitations. There is indeed much more in the rich archive 
of these narratives and my reading has already drawn on Mark’s rich and 
illuminating work not only in publishing the correspondence, but also in 
contextualizing the narratives within the specific historical, social and cultural 
milieu of the early apartheid South Africa.6 What I therefore hope the paper can 
offer, is lines of analyses that can be taken further, changed, bent, redeployed 
and connected with other possible modes of thought and work in feminist 
educational theory and praxis. 
 
Situating my analysis in between what can be ‘read’ and what can be imagined, I 
have been particularly interested in Lily’s epistolary practices geared towards 
establishing an emotional rapport between herself and her addressee. Thus in 
initiating their correspondence in the beginning of 1949 Lily was writing: ‘Should 
I be taken in a school near to a University I can be more pleased. I’m really sad 
about this matter – financial embarrassed, there is no-one who can help me. I like 
education’ (Marks, 1987, p.58). ‘Pleased’, ‘sad’ and ‘I like education’, two passions 
and an action, form a powerful Spinozist triangle here where joy, sadness and 
desire, the three primary affects according to Spinoza (2002) are brought 
together.  ‘I like education’ sets a whole plane of lines of flight in motion for both 
Lily and Mabel. And it is such a strong field of emotions staged here, that soon 
Lily will be able to move beyond her ‘powerless’ position in a place where she 
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can actually articulate her own desire and the way she sees herself relating to 
Mabel.  
 
Human beings tend to make connections with other human beings writes 
Spinoza suggesting that ‘there is […] nothing more useful to man than man’ 
(2002, p.153).  Lily’s desire for connection with Mabel has left some textual traces 
in the initial stages of their correspondence. Although her first letters between 
January and February 1949, follow the rules of formal openings and endings: 
‘Dear Madam’ or just ‘Madam’ and ‘Yours truly’, in March she is opening her 
letter with ‘My dear Miss Palmer’ and is ending it ‘With greetings and love’. As 
their correspondence progresses, Lily will even become critical of Mabel’s 
insistence on calling her ‘Miss Moya’ as the following extract from a letter 
postscript on June 22nd, 1949, indicates: ‘I can be glad if you would not call me 
“Miss Moya” but write “Dear Lily or Patience” not “Dear Miss Moya” ‘ (p.80). 
The statement of ‘I can be glad’ flags up the power of joy in bringing bodies 
together as they express their power to affect and be affected. In Spinoza’s 
philosophical propositions: ‘When we love a thing similar to ourselves we 
endeavour as much as we can to bring it about that it loves us’ and ‘the greater 
the emotion with which we imagine a thing loved to be affected towards us, the 
greater will be our feeling of glory’ (2002, p.105). As Lloyd has commented, 
‘similarity’ in Spinoza’s thought should not be understood as a ‘pre-existing 
sameness’, but rather as ‘a dynamic unfolding of commonalities achieved 
through collective action’ (1996, pp. 88-89). It is I suggest this process of 
commonalities in becoming that the negotiation of affective salutations between 
Lily and Mabel allows emerging. 
 
Of course there are emotional fluctuations in Lily’s beginnings and endings, 
particularly when Mabel does not respond to her agonising letters; letter writing 
is after all a dialogic relation par excellence (Stanley, 2004). By August 1949, 
however, Mabel is occasionally being addressed as ‘My dearest Dr Palmer’ and 
Lily as ‘Dear Lily’. The power of emotions has established an affective 
relationship between the two women despite their multi-levelled differences. Or 
has it? 
 
I am reading these emotional salutations and the way they are negotiated in 
Lily’s and Mabel’s correspondence, reflecting on our current practices as feminist 
educators when speaking and/or writing—not letters anymore but certainly e-
mails—to our students. I am thus asking myself about how often we have really 
let ourselves be driven/carried away by the flows of desire of our students 
particularly when learning outcomes of all sorts loom threateningly upon us; 
when the limited completion spans leave no time for any sort of passions to 
intervene in the lives and minds of our graduate students; when there is no 
space, place or time for sociological, philosophical or any other kind of 
imagination. In thus problematizing our present, I am turning again to the 
correspondence in an attempt to trace the history of this present of ours—the 
genealogical task par excellence. 
 
In focusing on the specific epistolary practices of openings, endings and 
salutations, what I want to suggest here is that Lily’s desire for education opens 
 8 
up a field, ‘produces a reality’ in Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization (1984) 
for power relations but also emotions and affects to come on stage: ‘I can be 
very pleased if you can take me into your college’ […] If you can answer me at 
your earliest possible I can be very glad’ (p.55) It is in this sequence of 
hypothetical phrases, that imagination meets passion. Restricted as she is within 
the boundaries of her locality, her race and her class, Lily can imagine that 
‘another future can be possible’. She wants to educate herself; in fact she 
becomes passionate about this prospect. In imagining her career as an educated 
woman, she is therefore surpassing the material conditions of her confinement 
and is empowered to struggle for a different life. 
 
In Spinoza’s thought, ‘passion and imagination interact often destructively, but 
also in ways that create points of transition out of diminishment into conatus7-
strengthening activity’ (Lloyd, 1996, p.78). As Moira Gatens has pointed out 
Spinoza thinks that without imagining that we can do something, we will 
actually never become able to do it (in James, 2000, p.47). Lloyd has further 
discussed how Antonio Negri has read Spinoza’s formulation of imagination as a 
path giving access to the realities of the social world: ‘Imagination can play a 
constitutive role, rather than just a distorting one; in understanding its fictions, 
reason reflects on the real social world in all its confusion and contradictoriness’ 
(1996, p.63). As already pointed out, it is in this light that Spinoza’s thought has 
been seen by feminist theorists as enabling ‘a reconceptualization of the 
imaginary and the possibility of a sociability of inclusion’ (James, 2000, p.40).   
 
Lily’s passionate desire for education can thus be fulfilled through her connection 
with Mabel—a feminist educator within the restrictions of her own geographies 
and times. If as already discussed, ‘there is nothing more useful to man than 
man’, then Spinoza’s philosophy according to Lloyd, lays the ground for ‘a 
theory of human sociability and friendship’ (1996, p.88) to be deployed and it is 
at this critical point that his ethics ‘merge with his politics’ (p.88). Moreover, his 
idea of the power of connectedness is totally ‘grounded in the physics of bodies’ 
(p.88). It is therefore textual traces of the ethics and politics of making emotional 
connections that my reading of the two women’s correspondence is further 
following.  
 
Indeed, Lily’s letters are overflowing with emotional words, phrases and 
greetings, which I have attempted to chart on a map of narrative moments. 
These moments I suggest express both her desire for education and her 
frustration and sadness in the idea of not becoming able to get what she wants: 
‘I’m still at home not in school only due to financial embarrassment. My heart 
aches when I see other children having gone and still going to school’ (p.60). 
Home and school are rendered here into two incompatible places that mark 
flows of movement. Lily feels disappointed and sad being ‘at home’ and not ‘in 
school’ and it is in Mabel’s help that she will deposit any hope for escaping her 
fate. Indeed her joy depends on Mabel’s possibility of emotional action: ‘I can be 
very glad if you can take me affectionately and let no other person nor thing 
restrict you from helping me. I’m still in great grief and hope for your earliest 
reply’ (p.65). When no answer comes, moments of emotional frustration are 
equally forcefully inscribed in her letters: ‘How can I show you the grief which 
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overwhelms me? … ‘Just think of the condition and grief I am in.’ (p.66) Later on 
however, when Mabel replies Lily’s joy is equally forcefully depicted as in a letter 
written on September 29th 1950: ‘Your letter has been the source of inwards 
happiness. I am really glad, glad indeed … I hope you stay for years with me. 
You cannot leave me alone in this merciless world … Your love has tongue-tied 
me’ (pp.112-113). 
 
Joy and disappointment are closely interrelated emotions in Spinoza’s thought, 
since ‘Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of a past thing whose outcome 
surpassed our hope [while] disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of a 
past thing whose outcome was contrary to our hope’ (2002, p.130). In this light 
joy springs up in the correspondence by the actual exchange of letters—
particularly so, when Mabel responds: ‘I become happy when you reply me […] I 
like receiving a letter from you’ (Marks, 1987, p.80) but also ‘It makes me very 
glad writing you this letter. As the year draws near to the end I really become 
more happy.’ (pp.80-81) In the emotional economy of Lily’s epistolary narratives 
it is not only spatiality that is inscribed—as in the school/home opposition 
mentioned above—but also time, the moment of her writing: ‘At the present 
moment I am feeling quite dry […]  I am just in the black hole of Calcutta and I 
don’t like it at all’ (pp.91,95).  
 
So far in this paper, I have discussed the limitations of a narrative approach to 
the study of emotions and in my attempt to transgress these limitations I have 
drawn on feminist interpretations of Spinoza’s thought in making sense of the 
power of ‘collective imaginings’ (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999). In this light I have 
argued that Lily’s flows of desire are liberating a set of subversive forces which 
produce a new reality for her, a new social milieu, since desire, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, always ‘produces the real’ (1984, p.26). In 
deterritorializing herself from striated spaces Lily’s lines of flight8 are making 
forceful connections with Mabel’s flows of desire to promote women’s 
education. It is these connections between lines of flight and flows of desire that I 
will be further following. 
 
 
Letter writing as a dialogic relation 
 
By responding to Lily’s plea for help Mabel is drawn into an intense emotional 
field opened up by their correspondence and in accepting to care for Lily she 
takes up ethical positions and responsibilities configured in the philosophical 
problematics  around the often neglected I/you, self/other relation. 
Commenting on the marginality of this relation in current discourses and 
practices, Adrianna Cavarero has noted that ‘the [singular] you is a term that is 
not at home in modern and contemporary developments of ethics and politics 
[…] the we is always positive, the plural you is a possible ally, the they has the face 
of an antagonist, the I is unseemly and the [singular] you is of course superfluous’ 
(2001, p.90-1). It has to be noted here of course that far from being positive, the 
‘we’ of feminism has long become a contested field. What I want to suggest here 
however, is that although Mabel’s relation to Lily is clearly placed in the 
neglected space of the ‘I/you’ relation, it nevertheless carries the possibility of 
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making connections with a reconfiguration of the ‘we’. In this proposition, what I 
think is strikingly interesting, is the embodiment of the ‘I/you’ relation 
grounded as it is, on the intersection of complex and multi-levelled differences. 
Seen from a line of philosophical thinking that focuses on difference as 
generating life9, ‘difference in itself’ in Deleuze’s philosophy (2004), these situated 
differences can be thought of and indeed imagined as ‘a dynamic unfolding of 
commonalities achieved through collective action’ a perspective that as has  
already been discussed comes from feminist interpretations of Spinoza’s 
philosophy (Lloyd, 1996, pp. 88-89). 
 
As the ethical space of the I/you connectedness extends and specific 
arrangements for Lily’s education are progressing, slowly but steadily, a decisive 
rupture emerges: Lily runs away from Umtata—her native location—to escape 
enforced marriage as explained in a letter to Mabel on September 12th, 1949:  
 
Besides all other reasons I once gave you before, all along our long 
correspondence I had never dared to tell you this but now I feel compelled 
to tell you that I could, or in fact try to endure every other difficulty 
patiently and humbly, but not to see myself getting married in an awkward 
manner, to a man I hated so much. That is one of the things I so much hate 
being married. I don’t even dream about it. That awful bondage. That is 
what my uncle did to me. He wanted only the dowary [sic] (1987, p.105) 
 
Lily’s voice emerges from the lines of her narrative to resist her oppression as a 
woman. It is actually by fighting against her gender oppression that Lily goes 
beyond her discursive resistance, so forcefully articulated in her letters and 
actually transforms her narratives into action. In getting away from Umtata, she 
defies both patriarchal and apartheid mobility restrictions while her 
revolutionary action, her actual deterritorialization is inscribed in the letter 
above. 
 
Lily’s escape breaks the linear continuity of her evolving relationship with Mabel 
and ‘produces a new reality’. Her runaway is a turning point, a transgression of 
the limit, ‘a flash of lightning in the night’ (Foucault, 1977, p.34), an action that 
although crossing the line will soon ‘return to the horizon of the uncrossable’ 
(p.34) since transgression and limit in Foucault’s thought play together becoming 
the condition of possibility for each other: ‘transgression incessantly crosses and 
recrosses a line which closes up behind it in a wave of extremely short duration’ 
(p.34). Despite what will turn out to be ‘a wave of short duration’, Lily’s runaway 
opens up a plane for relations of power and desire to come together forcefully. 
Her passionate desire for education and her utter abhorrence of the idea of 
marriage empower her to defy mobility restrictions framed by patriarchal and 
apartheid structures of domination. Her escape creates a position for her as a 
subject of feminism to inhabit—albeit not consciously so. Clearly her power to 
defy has its own conditions of possibility: the cultural capital of her Transkei 
background so well articulated by Marks (1987, pp. 13-18) was providing her 
with the tools of seeking help from those powerful others whose gendered and 
political history created tactical moments of alliance with her specific 
disadvantaged situation. 
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Mabel’s response—which is surprisingly supportive of such a risky and 
subversive act—is also conditioned by her own position as a subject of feminism 
of her own times, consciously constituted as such. This is how she articulates her 
support for Lily in a letter to Mr Bomback, the Bursar at Adams College, soon 
after the runaway: 
 
[…] She certainly is in spite of her very quiet and shy exterior, a young 
woman of extraordinary resource. I do not know if you have heard of her 
adventures […] I hope we may have no trouble with her guardian […] If he 
gives trouble I am quite prepared to fight the issue even to the extent of 
appearing in Court if necessary. I have long felt that the powers of Native 
guardians for their women wards are excessive and often abused and I would 
be prepared to expose the whole question if necessary.  
(Marks, 1987, pp.103) 
 
As Marks has pointed out, Mabel’s decision to promote the education of a young 
woman was indeed part of her feminist agenda (p.103). Moreover it derived 
from what she felt was her moral duty ‘to pay back’ women who had previously 
helped her advance her education and career as a woman. As she was writing to 
Lily on January 12th, 1951: ‘ 
 
Mrs Bernard Shaw long ago gave me a scholarship which she paid out of 
her own pocket in order that I might go and study in America […] The way 
in which you must pay me back is the way I am paying back Mrs Bernard 
Shaw, namely by extending help to another poor and ambitious student 
many years later when in a position to do so. (p.137)  
 
Within this specific situation Mabel’s position is heavily invested by the cultural 
effects of her white middle-class colonial background. Her decision to help Lily is 
contextualized within the philanthropic colonial discourses of her era but they 
are also framed within the discourses of the suffragette and Fabian movements 
she had actively participated in (see Marks, 1987). She thus helps Lily driven by 
her social debt to her own benefactors, by her own institutional position as a 
white promoter of non-white university education and of course by a sense of 
solidarity emerging from her own experience of gendered inequalities. As she 
was writing in a letter dated April 14th, 1949: ‘You are as a matter of fact very 
much on my conscience and I would feel myself very much to blame as an older 
woman who has been fairly successful in the field of education if I neglected your 
appeal’ (p.68). In the letter quoted above, where she is contemplating Lily’s 
guardian possible reactions after her escape, she was further writing: ‘I am 
prepared to make a fight to give her an education if it is necessary’ (p.104). Susan 
James has particularly pointed out that if we were to  ‘translate out of Spinoza-
speak’, then we would say that ‘we can create circumstances in which people see 
that it is in their best interest to extend the kind of supportive institutions that 
enable them to realize themselves better, both collectively and individually’ 
(2000, p.49). It is therefore in the context of the political and ethical responsibility 
of extending institutional support that Mabel’s practices can be made intelligible 
within a feminist cultural register. 
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The ‘seductiveness’ of emotions: desire meets power 
 
 Mabel’s response is shaped by the grand narratives, ideologies and macro-
structures constituting the matrix of her multiple subject positions, but it is also 
largely influenced by ‘the seductiveness’ of Lily’s emotional calls as expressed in 
a letter to Sibusisiwe Makhanya on November 4th, 1950:  
 
Her letters were so lively and well written that I became quite interested in 
her, sent her books and tried to raise a small fund from the University 
women in Durban for her education. In this, however, I was unsuccessful 
and I finally decided just to undertake the charge myself. (Marks, 1987, 
p.121)  
 
What Mabel expresses here most forcefully is the way she has been affected by 
Lily’s letters. As has already been noted, Spinoza’s idea that bodies have the 
power to affect and to be affected, opens up a distinct way of making sense of 
how individuals connect to form communities (See, Gatens and Lloyd, 1999). 
Moreover, reason and emotion are brought together in the above extract as 
Mabel is attempting to rationalize her emotional response to Lily’s letters. Her 
narrative moves beyond the reason/passion split, illustrating a crucial point that 
Moira Gatens has raised in discussing Spinoza’s notion of reason: ‘Even before 
then, before I had read any Deleuze, I thought that Spinoza’s notion of reason 
was an active emotion, so that there’s not a clear reason/passion split in his 
thought’ (in James, 2000, p.44).  
 
Although drawn in Lily’s flows of desire, Mabel’s emotions are soon channelled 
towards utilitarian aims and her praise to Lily on September 29th, 1949: ‘I think 
you really write in a very lively and amusing way’ (p.87) becomes a starting 
point for further asking her ‘to do me a short paper on “The Life of a Native Girl 
in a Native Reserve” ‘. Having taken the ethical responsibility of caring for Lily, 
Mabel is attempting here to transform this caring relation into a knowledge 
relation, thus rendering Lily’s emotional self into an object of knowledge, the 
Cartesian moment10 as Foucault has identified it (2005, p.14). Thus in a letter 
written on January 4th, 1950 Mabel’s narrative becomes straightforwardly 
didactic, as she attempts to guide Lily in the kind of essay she wants her to 
produce: 
 
… try to answer such questions as these: 
1. What is your earliest memory? 
2. How were you treated as a very small child? 
3. Is it true that Zulu children are very seldom punished?  
4. What sorts of toys did you have when you were tiny? 
5. When did your mother die, and what difference did it make to you?  
6. In what ways are little girls say of seven treated differently to little boys 
say of seven years? 
7. When did you first go to school? 
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[…] I liked particularly the letter you wrote to me describing your experience 
as a teacher (Marks, 1987, p.92)  
 
Mabel’s interrogation driven by her scientific interest in gender differences and 
young women’s lives seem to override her ignorance in the actual details of 
Lily’s life, a point that Marks also makes in introducing the letters (1987, p.12). 
Lily’s background was not Zulu and it was her father who had died, not her 
mother. But Mabel clearly had her own priorities in this relation and as their 
correspondence was further deployed, she was particularly careful with 
distancing herself from any further emotional intimacy, particularly in relation to 
Lily’s insistence on meeting and spending time together. It is in the backdrop of 
this emotional detachment that she failed to conceptualize the seriousness of the 
emotional crisis that Lily had been going through while at Adams College, as 
depicted in the following extracts from a letter written on January 12th, 1951:   
 
You say that one of your reasons for wishing to be in Durban is that you 
want to see more of me, but have you ever asked yourself whether I wish 
to see more of you? As a matter of fact I do not […] At all events you only 
bother me by these demands for a close and intimate friendship. Do not 
write to me as ‘my dearest Doctor Mabel Palmer’. ‘Dear Dr Palmer’ is 
enough and do not write to me more than once a month. You should also 
wait until I ask you to come and see me (Marks, 1987, p.137) 
 
Marks has noted that it was after this letter that Lily’s condition really worsened 
(1987, p.30) since in Lily’s words ‘your letter has extremely shocked me’ (1987, 
p.139). In this light, I suggest, it was Mabel’s investment in western first-wave 
feminist discourses stressing the importance of women’s distancing themselves 
from emotional ties and the imperative of their cultivating a sense of self-control 
and inward discipline, as a technology of the self towards emancipation—an 
Enlightened discourse par excellence—that ultimately started the cracking 
process of another woman’s life outside the western utopia of autonomy, 
rationality and freedom11.  
 
 
Relational selves: recognition and responsibility 
 
I have already referred to Mabel’s ethical position of responsibility at the point of 
her decision to look after Lily’s education earlier on in this paper, and I have 
related this ethical position to Cavarero’s philosophical articulation of the I/you 
relation (2000), where the self and the other are bound together through the 
narration of stories—in Mabel’s and Lily’s case through the exchange of 
epistolary narratives. Cavarero has contextualized this relation within the 
political practices of second wave feminism, but she has traced its genealogy in a 
series of unrecognised and often imaginary episodes of the Western 
philosophical tradition. Following this line of thought I have imagined how 
Mabel and Lily were bound together through the narratives of their epistolary 
exchange, but I have also traced significant differences in the way each woman 
conceptualized the nature and form of this relation. Thus for Lily it was the 
exciting prospect of emotionally relating to her benefactor—as a plane opening 
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up different futures for her—that animated her whole existence and indeed the 
letters she wrote. For Mabel on the other hand it was mainly a relation rationally 
inscribed in the context of her responsibility as a feminist progressive educator. 
Indeed she was at pains to raise the rational boundaries of her relation to Lily as 
the following extract from a letter written on June 7th, 1951 indicates: 
 
[…] in your letter you use the phrase ‘adopted daughter’. I don’t know if 
you were thinking of me and yourself when you used those words, but I 
feel I must make it plain that I have never said anything to justify you in 
believing so. I was interested in your letters and sympathetic towards a girl 
struggling for better education and I felt it was up to me to give you some 
help. That help I will give […] But beyond that I will not go and every time 
you press on me a desire for a more intimate relation you really force me 
back into reserve and guardedness in dealing with you […] But this does 
not mean that I am not interested in you or do not want to be kind to you; I 
do within due limits. (Marks, 1987, pp.161-162) [emphasis in the text] 
 
The distance in the two women’s conceptualization of their relation is stark here. 
Although married and divorced, Mabel had actually followed the non-mothering 
life-style of many of her contemporary educated women and even the idea of 
becoming a foster mother was inconceivable for her. On the other hand, 
imagining herself as an ‘adopted  daughter’ was something that Lily would 
not/could not have perceived as a problem or as a kind of emotional 
blackmailing in the way Mabel seems to have taken it.  As Deleuze has 
commented when difference affirms itself positively, then it is difficult and 
sometimes almost impossible for a harmonious balance to be sustained: ‘the 
problematic and the differential determine struggles or destructions [and] every 
thought becomes an aggression’ (2004, p.xix).  
 
It is therefore in the context of relationality and responsibility that I now want to 
situate an important part of the correspondence, between Mabel, Lily and 
Sibusisiwe. It is actually the last part of the correspondence being deployed in the 
middle of Lily’s crisis.   What this part of the correspondence reveals is that 
despite her bluntly expressed ‘coldness’, Mabel was not really indifferent with 
what was happening in Lily’s inner self. On the contrary, it was in her attempt to 
deal with the crisis that well before the letter of January 1951, she had decided to 
ask for the help of Sibusisiwe Makhanya, the first woman in South Africa to have 
been formerly educated as a social worker in the United States, a truly 
pioneering woman of her times (See, Marks, 1987). Thus on November 4th, 1950, 
Mabel was writing to Sibusisiwe: 
 
[…] I wonder if it could be possible for you to take some interest in a little 
protégé of mine? […] Lily does not seem to be settling down very 
satisfactorily, of course it is difficult for a girl coming in the middle of a term 
like that, and she is I am afraid a very self centred young person. (Marks, 
1987, pp.121-122) 
 
Mabel’s caring for Lily, judgemental as it appears, brings in a third party into the 
correspondence and indeed into her relation with Lily. Sibusisiwe was chosen by 
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Mabel in terms of her racial closeness to Lily as explicitly stated in Mabel’s letter 
to Sibusisiwe: ‘I feel she could be more effectively helped by a woman of her 
own race’ (Marks, 1987, p.122). This ‘closeness’ is indeed a figment of Mabel’s 
simplistic dichotomies between black and white women. In painting Sibusisiwe’s 
personal and family background, Marks has clearly shown significant cultural 
gaps between Lily’s strict missionary Christian background of the Eastern Cape 
and Sibusisiwe’s ‘strong and emotionally coherent’ Zulu identity (See Marks, 
1987, pp.30-39). As it has been widely theorized, ‘race’ is not a homogeneous 
entity necessarily creating alliances, sympathies and solidarity (See, Glenn, 2000). 
Despite Sibusisiwe’s reputation at the time ‘as a shining example for whites of 
what an African woman could achieve within the limits of the segregationist and 
patriarchal social system (Marks, 1987, p.37), her failure to communicate with 
Lily and protect her from dropping out of college is an effect of ‘the interracial 
field’ being itself a site of differences, conflicts and intense power games at play.  
 
Sibusisiwe’s position is less clear from the content of the letters, which are very 
few anyway. It is through her correspondence with Mabel however, that we can 
have a glimpse into Mabel’s disillusion and frustration over her relationship with 
Lily. Moreover, it is through their letters that we know about Mabel’s attempts 
to help Lily out of the Adams College crisis. Thus in a letter on June 21st, 1951 
Mabel was writing about her decision—not yet disclosed to Lily—to give her a 
second chance: ‘I have decided to send Lily to Mariannhill; they are willing to 
take her and offer all the courses she has been studying […] I do hope she will be 
happier there;’ (Marks, 1987, p.173). Since Lily’s unhappiness with Adams was 
related to difficulties arising from what she perceived as a total lack of discipline, 
the decision to be transferred to Mariannhill was taken on the grounds that this 
was a disciplinarian Catholic school which kept boys and girls strictly 
segregated12. In addition, the transfer would be smoother for Lily since the 
school’s curriculum was very much similar to Adam’s College. Lily would learn 
about this decision through a different letter written to her on the same date:   
 
Dear Lily, 
I am sorry I have been some time in answering your letters, but I have 
been v. busy with university work and have had to leave my private 
letters for the time being […] I have practically decided to send you to 
Marriannhill next term […] I am coming down to Adams on Monday 
afternoon to complete the arrangements about your transfer […] (Marks, 
1987, p.174) 
 
However, in the same letter of practically responding to Lily’s frustration about 
her current school, Mabel sets up certain restrictions to her emotional needs, by 
asking Lily to decline an invitation from her aunt and cousin to spend her 
summer holidays with them in Johannesburg. Mabel was reluctant to give 
permission, since she was afraid that there might have been a secret plot for 
getting Lily back to her guardian whose power she had escaped by fleeing from 
Umtata: ‘I continue to feel that I cannot approve of your going to your aunt and 
cousin until I have more evidence that their invitation is not a trick to get you 
back under your guardian’s control’ (Marks, 1987, p.174). In her attempt to offer 
Lily alternative ‘homely’ holidays Mabel had asked Sibusisiwe to look after her 
 16 
during the summer holidays. Feeling extremely frustrated about this restriction, 
however, Lily would finally succeed in persuading Mabel to give her permission 
to go. The hidden context of this permission is articulated in Mabel’s letter to 
Sibusisiwe on July 8th, 1951: 
 
Dear Miss Makanya, 
 I hope you don’t disapprove of my decision to let Lily go to Johannesburg 
[…] I hoped we might convince her that it was unwise to go, but if she insists 
and says that there is a death in the family, and that they want her in 
connection with that, I felt I had to let her go. I am still not sure that it is not a 
trick […] but to tell the truth, I shall not be very sorry if it is. She behaved 
very badly […] Her report is not at all satisfactory […] In fact I am becoming 
v.sorry that I ever undertook to help her […] However if she comes back I 
shall give her the rest of the year at Mariannhill (Marks, 1987, p.180). 
 
Mabel’s decision is framed by her ethical responsibilities towards Lily, but also by 
her own intense frustration and disillusion over Lily’s behaviour and educational 
underachievement at Adams. It is a decision taken in a matrix of ethical 
necessities—recognizing and respecting Lily’s responsibilities towards her 
family—and real life contingencies. While however, Mabel had taken the decision 
to continue supporting Lily on rational and ethical grounds, Lily had taken her 
own decisions regarding her life. Driven by emotional disillusion and despair she 
had given up the dream of educating herself and had run away.  
 
The relational field that was opened up by the force of emotions of her 
correspondence with Mabel was ultimately colonized by power relations and 
structural differences. Lily’s dropping out from college had reterritorialized the 
self within class/race segmentarities. However, what has mostly intrigued me in 
reading her correspondence with Mabel is not the promising beginning or the 
harsh end, but the ‘intermezzo’, the space in between segmentarities, Lily’s lines 
of flight in becoming other. Mapping this extremely divided and contested field 
that the epistolary narratives have opened up, what I have traced is a diverse 
range of subject positions for female subjects to inhabit but also for ‘the subject 
of feminism’ to emerge from. In thus focusing on the intermezzo, I have 
imagined virtual possibilities of becoming a woman—through connecting with 
other women in a critical community of action— within the horizon of what I 
would like to think of as the feminist imaginary. 
 
 
Towards an ethology of power: the dance between power and desire 
 
Lily’s story is not a happy one and in the epilogue of her book Shula Marks 
paints a very grey picture of Lily’s mental breakdown that completely 
jeopardized her life. In this final section I therefore want to reflect on the 
possibility of reading this correspondence within the Spinozist framework of ‘an 
ethology of power’—a theory of the capacities of bodies for affecting and being 
affected. As Gatens and Lloyd have argued, such an approach enables the 
understanding of human beings—their constitution, their relations and their 
actions—not in terms of ‘moralistic judgements’ but rather ‘as a more or less, 
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successful experiment to create a sustainable world’ (1999, p.147). Indeed, it is in 
the light of an experiment in life that the three women’s coming together in 
terms of their passion for education can be made intelligible if we are to move 
beyond the recognition and acknowledgement of differences to a social 
imagination of the virtual possibilities of grappling with these differences then 
and now.  
 
In this context I want to rethink my initial argument of making sense of these 
epistolary narratives through a feminist redeployment of the theoretical tools of 
the Foucauldian power and the Deuleuzo-Guattarian desire, in terms of their 
interrelation, their dancing together. Thus, drawing on Foucault, I have already 
suggested that the narratives of this correspondence should be analysed in a 
network of intense power relations at play as they are interwoven with gender, 
race and age differences. Foucault’s analytics of power however cannot fully 
account for how Mabel’s and Lily’s relation developed in the first place and it is 
here that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of desire has become useful. I have 
been particularly interested in the way Deleuze and Guattari theorise desire not 
as lack but as productive, and in this way always constitutive of a social field. 
Lily’s desire for education has made connections with feminist discourses and 
practices of her own time. These connections have indeed shaken the grounds of 
Lily’s disadvantaged position and have thrust her into lines of flight, have 
literally deterritorialized her from striated places.  
 
In charting these lines of flight, I have drawn on Deleuze and Guattari’s 
schizoanalytics, as a way of imagining ‘what a subject’s desiring machines are, 
how they work, with what syntheses, what bursts of energy in the machine, 
what constituent misfires, with what flows, what chains and what becomings in 
each case’ (1984, p.338). There were indeed many misfires and failures and as a 
matter of fact Lily’s reterritorialization on the western ideals of educational 
discipline, emotional detachment and rationalized life directions fatally destroyed 
her desiring machine. Her ultimate diagnosis of schizophrenia and her 
consequent enclosement in a series of mental institutions of apartheid South 
Africa ruined her whole life and it is a harsh episode in a genealogy of cruelties 
which emerge as  effects of the power/desire encounter.  
 
Still, looking into this correspondence from the angle of an ethology of power, I 
have avoided conferring moralistic judgements on the three women’s deeds. I 
have been mostly interested in the power of their bodies to affect and be affected 
and in this way to experiment on the possibility of forming a community based 
on the necessity for women’s education to be advanced. Despite the flows of 
aggression and cruelty that difference can release, it is still possible I argue to 
imagine virtual relations that could have been actualized and in this context to go 
on defending the political project of feminism bringing together ‘women’ not on 
the basis of an essential ontology but on a political and ethical platform of 
solidarity, the feminist imaginary. In this light, Megan Boler’s suggestion of 
rethinking the power of emotions becomes I believe so timely and so urgent: 
 
By rethinking the absence of emotion, how emotion shapes how we treat 
other people and informs our moral assumptions and judgements, I 
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believe we have the potential to radically change our cultural values and 
violent practices of cruelty and injustice, which are often rooted in 
unspoken ‘emotional’ investments in unexamined ideological beliefs. 
(1999, p.xvi-xvii) 
 
This plea I suggest keeps raising political and ethical responsibilities for feminist 
educators as we are continuously involved in stories and relations of failure and 
disillusion over what feminism is about and of what it can do. Paraphrasing Foucault:  
‘Feminists know what they do. They frequently know why they do what they do; but 
what they don't know is what what they do does (Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow 
1982, p.187). 
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Notes 
1. As Shula Marks notes, Lily Moya is a pseudonym (1987, pp.xiii, 42) which 
was attributed to the young Xhosa woman of the correspondence 
according to the request of her family (Marks, personal communication). 
2. Although the publication of this correspondence is indicated as ‘edited’ by 
Shula Marks, it is important to note here that the letters have been 
published en masse (Marks, 2005, personal communication), as they were 
found in the file ‘Lily Moya’ amongst the papers of Dr Palmer, ‘Palmer 
Mabel/Papers, 1908-1951’ in the Killie Campbell Africana Library, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, where they are still housed. As 
Shula Marks notes, in transcribing the letters ‘ I have retained the original 
spelling, punctuation and usage in the correspondence’, adding that ‘I 
have inserted  corrections or explanations in the notes only where there is 
a danger of non-comprehension or confusion’ (1987, p.44). Apart from the 
book, Marks has published two papers on the correspondence 
(Marks,1989, 2000). The discussion of my paper totally relies on Mark’s 
(1987) publication of the correspondence in its entirety. I am grateful to 
Shula Marks for responding to my request for clarification.  
3. The term intersectionality was coined in 1994 by Kimberle Crenshaw to 
capture systems of interlocking inequalities. Going beyond the gender 
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aspects of racial discrimination, intersectionality sheds lights on the 
multiplicity and complexity of ways in which gender, race and class but 
also other axes of identity difference create the conditions of possibility for 
discrimination and abuse. See, Crenshaw, 1995. However the history of 
the concept goes back much further and has been of critical importance to 
the theory and praxis of black feminism. It is in this context that I have 
placed Mark’s influential publication in what has now been identified as 
the ‘intersectionality literature’. 
4. For analyses and discussions of letters and correspondences in sociological 
research, see Jolly 1997, Barton  and Hall, 1999, the special issue of the 
Journal of European studies on ‘Lives and Letters’ edited by Montefiore 
and Hallet in 2002, and Stanley, 2004. 
5. I want to thank Kari Dehli whose insightful comment made me reflect on 
this limitation in the discussion of an earlier version of this paper at the 5th 
International Gender and Education Conference at the University of 
Cardiff in March 2005. 
6. This correspondence, dated between 1949 and 1951 is actually placed in 
the initial period of the enactment of apartheid laws in 1948, when racial 
discrimination and segregation was officially institutionalized. The formal 
legal framework of this initial period included the ‘Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages Act’ in 1949 and the ‘Population Registration Act’, the 
‘Suppression of Communism Act’ and the ‘Group Areas Act in 1950 and 
were followed by more Acts later on. These race laws touched every 
aspect of social life, including a prohibition of marriage and sex between 
non-whites and whites, the sanctioning of ``white-only'' jobs, the 
requirement that all South Africans be racially classified into one of three 
categories: white, black (African), or coloured (of mixed decent). Finally 
strict spatial segregations and mobility restrictions were imposed. Affluent 
city and areas were assigned to whites, while non-whites were banished 
into the townships. The Separate Amenities Act in 1953 created, among 
other things, separate beaches, buses, hospitals, schools, and even park 
benches, while the Bantu Education Act (1953) brought in various 
measures to reduce the education attainable by black people to the level 
of training for low level manual jobs. The previous regimes of pass books 
were strengthened and all blacks and coloureds were required to carry 
identity documents containing fingerprints, photo and information at all 
times. Access to non-black areas, was strictly prohibited without specific 
permission even for short-term visits. It goes without saying that non-
compliance with the race laws were dealt with harshly. Clearly the 
apartheid is the central theme marking the 20th history of South Africa 
(1948-1994) and it has been theorized and discussed from a wide variety of 
perspectives. For a critical historical overview of the apartheid system, see 
amongst others Worger and Clark, 2004 and Worden and Lee, 2000.  
7. Conatus, as the power of striving to persevere in being is a fundamental 
concept in the philosophy of Spinoza. For an illuminated discussion of 
Spinoza’s Ethics, see Lloyd, 1996. 
8.  ‘Deterritorialization’, ‘reterritorialization’ and ‘lines of flight’ are critical 
notions in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy in their influential work 
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Capitalism and schizophrenia (1984, 1988). For a discussion of these 
concepts in relation to emotional learning, see Tamboukou, 2003c. 
9. In Difference and Repetition (2004 [1968]) Deleuze-himself perceived as a 
philosopher of difference par excellence- charts this philosophical line of 
thinking. 
10. According to Foucault (2005, p.14), the Cartesian moment qualifies the 
primacy of the imperative to ‘know yourself’ in the modern world, while 
in the antiquity it was assumed that the need to take care of oneself, 
created the need to know yourself, there was a subordination of 
knowledge to care. 
11. For a discussion of ‘technologies of the female self in education’ see 
Tamboukou, 2003b, particularly chapter 5. 
12. Marks offers an illuminating commentary on Adam’s College history and 
the structures that turned out to become hostile and indeed exclusive for 
Lily (1987, pp.19-30) 
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1 As Shula Marks notes, Lily Moya is a pseudonym (1987, pp.xiii, 42) which was attributed to the young 
Xhosa woman of the correspondence according to the request of her family (Marks, personal 
communication). 
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2 Although the publication of this correspondence is indicated as ‘edited’ by Shula Marks, it is important to 
note here that the letters have been published en masse (Marks, 2005, personal communication), as they 
were found in the file ‘Lily Moya’ amongst the papers of Dr Palmer, ‘Palmer Mabel/Papers, 1908-1951’ in 
the Killie Campbell Africana Library, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, where they are still housed. 
As Shula Marks notes, in transcribing the letters ‘ I have retained the original spelling, punctuation and 
usage in the correspondence’, adding that ‘I have inserted  corrections or explanations in the notes only 
where there is a danger of non-comprehension or confusion’ (1987, p.44). Apart from the book, Marks has 
published two papers on the correspondence (Marks,1989, 2000). The discussion of my paper totally relies 
on Mark’s (1987) publication of the correspondence in its entirety.  
 
3 The term intersectionality was coined in 1994 by Kimberle Crenshaw to capture systems of interlocking 
inequalities. Going beyond the gender aspects of racial discrimination, intersectionality sheds lights on the 
multiplicity and complexity of ways in which gender, race and class but also other axes of identity 
difference create the conditions of possibility for discrimination and abuse. See, Crenshaw, 1995. However 
the history of the concept goes back much further and has been of critical importance to the theory and 
praxis of black feminism. It is in this context that I have placed Mark’s influential publication in what has 
now been identified as the ‘intersectionality literature’. 
 
4 For analyses and discussions of letters and correspondences in sociological research, see Jolly 1997, 
Barton  and Hall, 1999, the special issue of the Journal of European studies on ‘Lives and Letters’ edited by 
Montefiore and Hallet in 2002, and Stanley, 2004. 
 
5 I want to thank Kari Dehli whose insightful comment made me reflect on this limitation in the discussion 
of an earlier version of this paper at the 5th International Gender and Education Conference at the 
University of Cardiff in March 2005. 
 
6 This correspondence, dated between 1949 and 1951 is actually placed in the initial period of the 
enactment of apartheid laws in 1948, when racial discrimination and segregation was officially 
institutionalized. The formal legal framework of this initial period included the ‘Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages Act’ in 1949 and the ‘Population Registration Act’, the ‘Suppression of Communism Act’ and 
the ‘Group Areas Act in 1950 and were followed by more Acts later on. These race laws touched every 
aspect of social life, including a prohibition of marriage and sex between non-whites and whites, the 
sanctioning of ``white-only'' jobs, the requirement that all South Africans be racially classified into one of 
three categories: white, black (African), or coloured (of mixed decent). Finally strict spatial segregations 
and mobility restrictions were imposed. Affluent city and areas were assigned to whites, while non-whites 
were banished into the townships. The Separate Amenities Act in 1953 created, among other things, 
separate beaches, buses, hospitals, schools, and even park benches, while the Bantu Education Act (1953) 
brought in various measures to reduce the education attainable by black people to the level of training for 
low level manual jobs. The previous regimes of pass books were strengthened and all blacks and coloureds 
were required to carry identity documents containing fingerprints, photo and information at all times. 
Access to non-black areas, was strictly prohibited without specific permission even for short-term visits. It 
goes without saying that non-compliance with the race laws were dealt with harshly. Clearly the apartheid 
is the central theme marking the 20th history of South Africa (1948-1994) and it has been theorized and 
discussed from a wide variety of perspectives. For a critical historical overview of the apartheid system, see 
amongst others Worger and Clark, 2004 and Worden and Lee, 2000.  
7 Conatus, as the power of striving to persevere in being is a fundamental concept in the philosophy of 
Spinoza. For an illuminated discussion of Spinoza’s Ethics, see Lloyd, 1996. 
8 ‘Deterritorialization’, ‘reterritorialization’ and ‘lines of flight’ are critical notions in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy in their influential work Capitalism and schizophrenia (1984, 1988). For a discussion 
of these concepts in relation to emotional learning, see Tamboukou, 2003c. 
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9 In Difference and Repetition (2004 [1968]) Deleuze-himself perceived as a philosopher of difference par 
excellence- charts this philosophical line of thinking. 
 
10 According to Foucault(2005, p.14), the Cartesian moment qualifies the primacy of the imperative to 
‘know yourself’ in the modern world, while in the antiquity it was assumed that the need to take care of 
oneself, created the need to know yourself, there was a subordination of knowledge to care. 
11 For a discussion of ‘technologies of the female self in education’ see Tamboukou, 2003b, particularly 
chapter 5. 
 
 
12 Marks offers an illuminating commentary on Adam’s College history and the structures that turned out to 
become hostile and indeed exclusive for Lily (1987, pp.19-30) 
